Mister Minister, the Israel Palestinian peace process is in total deadlock. On the one hand your government refuses to stop colonization, to withdraw from the lines of the 1967
frontiers asked by US president BarackObama, and on the other Hamas
refuses Israel the right to exist. How long can this last?

What you’ve said about Hamas is true. What you’ve said about Israel is not true. We are ready to have a two state [country] for two [kinds of] people; we are open to negotiation. We are aware the Middle East is heading towards a problematic period. We are ready to play our part to honestly and genuinely find a solution dealing, of course, with boarder
security, refugees and end-of-conflict.

But not the 1967 frontiers…

I don’t think the difference is that much. We strongly believe the major settlement blocks and the Jewish neighborhood in Jerusalem should be part of Israel and borders should be delimited within which we’ll have a solid majority for generations to come. On the other hand there will be a place for a demilitarized independent Palestinian state viable on
any aspect.

How has Israel reacted to Mubarak’s fall in Egypt and recent events from the Arab Spring?

The political aspect from the streets of Tunisia to Bahrain is extremely important historically because nothing like this has happened in the past 100 years since the collapse of the Ottoman empire. Nothing will be the same. It’s clear to us that we could find ourselves alone as the only stable island of democracy and Western values in the region. And we might have to protect ourselves alone. But we do not pretend that we can influence. We hope for them [Egypt’s citizen] that it will develop in the right direction. Probably in the long term it is an extremely inspiring movement, but in the short term it could easily end up with some of these countries being taken over by extremists and some others by dictators that we cannot predict. Time will tell, we are clearly living in
interesting times.

Do you fear possible reactions from Hezbollah or Iran should Bashar
Al-Assad be overthrown?

First of all we feel that if he’s overthrown by his own people it means he has lost his legitimacy and effectiveness. And I believe that he is doomed. Bashar
Al-Assad is doomed because he used so much brutal force that he lost legitimacy in the eyes of his own people. He will probably survive for several months in a weakened [position] but he is basically doomed. This will weaken dramatically both Iran and Hezbollah, I believe that some of their responses have to do with the fact they genuinely feel that without Assad they will be much weaker and that’s a good reason for Hezbollah to be worried, and we should not regret it.

Does Israel wish for the fall of Bashar Al-Assad?

We do not pretend to control events in the neighborhood. We do not even influence, we do not make vain kind of hollow prayers. We tried for a long time to find a way to make peace with the Assad family. I tried as a prime minister with his father, but we could not accomplish it because he wanted all of his demands to be accepted before the opening of negotiations and as a condition to open it. That was unacceptable. We tried with his son Bashar in the past to see if there was an opportunity. It’s now too late. Even if he survives, he will not have the legitimacy or power to go into negotiations or make the decisions needed in order to achieve peace. In this regard we are out of the game. But my observation as former intelligence head is that he’s over. It might take another few months, but something new is going to happen. And because he lost his capacity to bring peace, I don’t see a great threat in having someone else, probably to end up in a
better regime.

Do you feel that the vacuum left by Hosni Mubarak in Egypt could benefit
fundamentalist movements?

It could but I hope it won’t. I hope that inner balance in Egypt will be strong enough, mainly that the armed forces play the role of caretaker and stabilizer. That’s the only wide scale meritocracy in Egypt.

It’s a place where upward social mobility holds a lot of influence, a lot of respect from the public. So probably they could be a sort of balance to the extremists. Probably they could reach equilibrium with them at a price. Syria, I believe, is more secular than people think. So probably after the fall of Bashar there will be some coalition, but I don’t think that the Muslim brothers will be especially effective. No one can predict what will happen because there are a lot of tribes, some quite extreme. And Yemen, of course, is a big riddle. But basically all is overshadowed by Iran.

We should never lose sight of Iran. This is the motto, the engine behind many events, the one who wants to harvest the fruits of this. And sanctions will get much looser because of the fall of these autocrats. The attention is, for the falling autocrats around the Arab world, on the price of oil, so they feel quite happy for the time being. But, as I mentioned, they keep trying to reach nuclear military capability. They keep sponsoring terror everywhere.

Do you think Iran could ignite a war between Shias and Sunnis?

Probably. We can’t make prophecies in the Middle East, especially about the future. They probably might try. They have their own things to worry about and if the world will stand united against them, accelerating the sanctions and making them more deadly, making clear that all options are on the table, they probably will behave more benignly.

]]> http://www.trendsmagazine.net/out_wordpress/wordpress/2011/07/22/living-in-%e2%80%9cinteresting-times%e2%80%9d/feed/ http://www.trendsmagazine.net/out_wordpress/wordpress/2011/07/22/the-other-side/ http://www.trendsmagazine.net/out_wordpress/wordpress/2011/07/22/the-other-side/#comments Fri, 22 Jul 2011 08:26:40 +0000 admin http://www.trendsmagazine.net/out_wordpress/wordpress/?p=929

For years American author, screenwriter and staff writer for the New Yorker magazine, Lawrence Wright, has traveled across the Arab world to learn and write about Al-Qaeda, for which he won a Pulitzer prize. In May he traveled to Tel-Aviv to share with Israelis his knowledge: Osama Bin Laden may be dead, but the Jewish state has more to fear now than ever.

As if on cue, on the day of Wright’s arrival, May 15th, thousands of Arabs, mostly Palestinian refugees, streamed to Israel’s borders and tried to cross it. Israel shot dead at least 10 of them. Like in Tunisia and Egypt, these youth took part in a Facebook-organized action – this time for the anniversary of Yawm al-Naqba, the Day of the Catastrophe, when Jews and Arabs went
to war in 1948 over Palestine, resulting in a divided land, a Jewish state
and hundreds of thousands of
Palestinian refugees.

I sat with Wright the next day at a modish coffee shop in Tel-Aviv, a block from the Cameri Theatre, the place where he would spend three nights performing a unique one-man-show to Israeli audiences in an effort to share with them his concerns for their future.

“I think Israel is really in danger and the long-term prospects for Israel are not good without peace,” said Wright with a slight Texan drawl, as
we drank coffee.

The Arab uprisings have changed the equation for Israel, explained Wright, who connected the Arab Spring uprisings to the border-rush on Naqba Day.

“They appear to be a generational movement, largely non-violent, organized through social media, and demanding that the status quo be swept away,” said Wright, a fit man in his early sixties with thick wavy dark hair streaked with grey. “As long as Israel appears to be standing in opposition to change, it will be placed in the uncomfortable and demeaning position of being a part of the old, frozen, autocratic order.”

Wright’s book on Al-Qaeda, The Looming Tower, which won the Pulitzer Prize in 2007, said that the uprisings underscored Al-
Qaeda’s irrelevance, because they succeeded in ousting dictators that Al-Qaeda failed
to do.

Now, with Osama Bin Laden dead, the appeal of the Al-Qaeda banner will diminish, “unless Al-Qaeda pulls off something extraordinary,” said Wright. “That’s why I’m here.”

Unlike most Israelis and many Westerners, Wright sees a strong connection
between the September 11 attacks on the US and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

“I believe very strongly that the Israeli-Palestinian crisis has been the source of inflammation in the Muslim world for decades,” said Wright. “Bin Laden and other radical Islamists exploited it. If this crisis were resolved Al-Qaeda leadership would be in tears. It’s a huge source of recruitment. They’ve been able to use the plight of the Palestinians as justification of their actions.”

With Bin-Laden gone and more Arab leaders accountable to their people, Israel is in more danger. The solution, says Wright, is for Israel to appeal to the Arabs and meet with them.

“For things to change there needs to be outreach,” he said.

Based on his reporting in the Gaza Strip and Israel following Israel’s deadly Operation Cast Lead offensive in 2008-2009, Wright wrote The Human Scale, a one-man performance about the blockade on Gaza and the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit who has been held there for almost five years. Hamas demands the
release of some 1,400 Palestinian prisoners for his ransom.

For 90 minutes, while he stands on the stage in front of a desk covered with books, Wright tells the story of the conflict, weaving Biblical anecdotes with ayahs from the Quran, modern history and ancient history, and enumerating some of the worst attacks the two sides made against the other. All the while, numerous photos and videos flash on screens behind him – many of them horrific pictures of attacks by both sides. Dead bodies laying on the floor of the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron where the Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein opened fire, killing 29 people in 1993. A Hamas-bombed Israeli bus with bodies hanging half-outside the windows.

Wright makes us ask, what is the value of a human life? He shows how as Gazans’ lives deteriorate Shalit’s ‘value’ increases (Hamas has upped the ransom). And he asks: is one Jew ‘worth’ more than 1,400 Palestinians? While more than one-and-a-half million people wallow in poverty from a strangling Israeli-imposed blockade, Shalit has become a national icon in Israel. Cross country marches, traffic-blocking demonstrations, media discussions, and the Save Gilad Shalit tent only meters away from the entrance to the
Israeli prime minister’s residence, where his father, Noam, stays.

The day before Wright’s first performance I ran into Noam Shalit at a supermarket in Jerusalem. He was wearing a “Free Gilad” T-shirt and choosing yoghurt in the dairy section. I told him I met Wright
who hoped his performance would help Israelis see a broader picture of the conflict and eventually lead to the release of his son. I asked Noam if he thought that would help.

“He is thinking about long-term developments, a new Middle East, peace between the Israelis and Palestinians,” he said, “We don’t want to wait for that. We want Gilad out now. Five years is enough.”

One of the most striking things about Wright is the way he speaks: evenly, without any discernable emotion. It makes it difficult to accuse him of bias when the screens behind him display video footage such as Israeli soldiers brutally beating a Palestinian man or a young Palestinian girl running aimlessly after her family was killed by an Israeli artillery shell.

While his voice may be passionless, Wright cares deeply about this region, which is why he travelled to Israel to
perform the show.

“I’m not doing this for the money, that’s for sure,” said Wright with a laugh. “I want to help people see the other side.”

Did he think he could change Israelis’ entrenched views? “Maybe I’m delusional,” he said. “I have no idea how this will affect Israelis. But I feel I have to try.”

At the end of the play, the audience clapped and Wright appeared somewhat surprised and visibly moved. Yet, despite their applause, many were still unable to see the misery of the other side.

Rolando Eisen, a retired businessman, said it was difficult to see an Israeli soldier breaking the bones of a Palestinian, but “the question is: what is the reaction of Israeli society to these people? And if I remember correctly the reaction was to put those soldiers into jail. There is a legal system here and free press and a society that reports these things and people are brought to justice and these aberrations go to jail. Unfortunately, our neighborhood is not like that.”

I had to remind Eisen that breaking Palestinian bones was the policy of then-Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, as Wright mentioned twice in the performance. Eisen was at a loss for words.

Of all the people I interviewed after the show only one elderly Holocaust survivor said it was very interesting and that she believes Israel should treat the Arabs better.

On the day of his last performance, Wright traveled to Jerusalem to meet Noam Shalit at the protest tent. Afterwards, I met Wright at the nearby Restobar Café, which was bombed in 2002 when it was called Moment.

He told me that the night before a Jewish settler asked him accusingly why he thought he could come to Israel and tell Israelis his perspective about their conflict.

“I told him I’m an American and we have a stake in this conflict,” his voice rising unusually. “Nine-Eleven is a response to what comes out of this region. And frankly my taxpayer money is funding this conflict. I have a right to be concerned.”

The Arab world region is changing, what has led to this change?

Several factors have contributed to this. Some of them are related to political reforms. For decades we did not witness the right political changes and there have been a number of socio-
economic problems that were not addressed properly. These issues today are pressing problems for the countries that have gone through political transformation. The nations that did not witness a major political transformation are also facing the same issues, and it is a combination of the bulge in youth population, unemployment and a mismatch between the skills of the workforce and markets’ demands and needs. We all know that the youth in the Middle East and North Africa region represent some 30 percent of the total population. There will be more young people who will be entering the labor market in the near future. There is an immense wealth of talented Arab youth, but the countries have failed to create meaningful jobs for a large number of young people. Most of jobs came from the public sector and that gave rise to the unemployment rate in the region because the number of jobs created was less, and that includes oil-exporting countries in the region where the percentage of jobless is quite high.

When the young population enrolled in the mostly non-productive public sector, a big mismatch between skills and market demand was created and due to this we have a seen a large influx of foreign labor which contributed to the rise in the unemployment rate. Although the region saw some reforms and growth in the past decade, that did not translate in raising living conditions of local people.

Economic disparities have been wide in this region. The subsidies are basically product-based and universal, so the rich and poor get the same discount. This disparity has not been corrected, and we also don’t have the right kind of tax system. Public money has not been utilized in a proper manner and all of these factors were at the root of the Arab Spring.

What role has technology played in demonstrations in this region?

Well, definitely technology and social media have played a significant role in this movement for change. The regimes were controlling the traditional way of communication – TV and print media – in a very tight manner. Social networking played a big part in mobilizing people and we saw this in Egypt. Even the new government used social media to communicate with public more than traditional methods. The change in the government, for instance, was first announced on Facebook. I think the expansion of social media and development of technology means that it is now available to all. However, this has not been the cause of transformation, but it definitely accelerated this transformation and transition.

Do you think new governments would help change the critical view of global bodies such as UNDP, IMF and WEF about some Arab economies?

First of all, if we look back at the past decade, we saw few reforms and growth, unfortunately those reforms were too little too late, we had some liberalization but it benefited only a few companies. What we need is a two-track reform, one would be for short-term, where government’s work toward achieving stability, brings in a policy of good governance to restore public trust and refocus on their social programs. More importantly, for the long-term, there is a great need to come up with the new economic agenda and this will focus on key pillars. First is rejuvenating growth through supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises. The government should also facilitate in making a room for local entrepreneurs to prosper. The second pillar would be to accelerate the structural reforms such as the changes in the labor market so that the workforce’s output would meet the market demand. It will also include reforming the education system, bringing in the social security measures for citizens. The social protection mechanism would definitely act as a social stabilizer.

Do you see a rebirth of the Arab world?

This transformation is providing a lot of hope to so many people, but this transition carries a lot of risk and it all depends on the approach used to devise a new framework that is more democratic in decision making, keeping the economy modern and not going back to the old recipes in terms of the role of state and in terms of weakening the role of the private sector. It is very critical how reforms are conducted and how the inclusive transformation is implemented. The local companies that are operating at regional or international level should be supported by the state machinery.

How is the Arab society likely to change with this revolution in the region?

First of all we expect the level of information available to the general public to improve. Transparency and access to information is very important for people to be able to play an active role in policymaking.

What kind of risks are involved as the regimes change in the region?

There are several risks. Transition to democracy will take time and in some countries macroeconomic situation and public finances are not strong enough to accommodate the expansion of government or to implement new policies. We have noticed during the course of these recent events that the financial condition of some countries has deteriorated. In the short term we might see a higher level of state involvement in economic and financial affairs. Besides this, there would always be a risk of second uprising, if the root cause of transformation is not addressed. Millions of jobs should be created and social welfare programs should be implemented.

Do you see the effects of the Arab Spring trickling to other states in
the region?

I think we are going through a major transformation and each country is likely to take a different approach. We are seeing the emergence of a new Arab world, where certain values would become standard, but as each country has its own social fabric and political dynamics the process would be gradual.

What led to the latest developments in the Middle East, which is now termed the Arab Spring?

The reason is pure and simple. Like people in any country of the world, who have been exposed to the same kind of government or governance for the past 30 to 35 years would become tired of such system and this has been the case with the Arab countries where we saw no change in the main political figures and power structure. There were a limited section of people that were the beneficiary of such a system, and this kind of rule is no longer sustainable. As a result, people all of a sudden erupted and said they had enough and wanted change. There were demands from the people for a government, where human rights are preserved and where nobody has a claim on power single handedly.

Summing up the Arab economies, the UNDP, WEF and other global bodies have complained about too much interference from governments, a lack of competitiveness and entrepreneurs. Do you think this will change?

It could improve with the democratic governments, provided the right of private property and protection of entrepreneurship are guaranteed by the law. A democratic system would necessarily have a legal system that is well developed and judicious. The economic change would depend on top government officials and people close to the state officials letting the market and entrepreneurs benefit from the new system of governance. Transforming the government into a more elaborate democratic status would certainly make possible that economy functions better, but it will not happen in the short term. In the near future, we’d see a lot of havoc in the process of delivering justice and there will be a lot of pull and push for power among several groups. So far we have seen some changes through transformation of power, but we don’t see democracy in full bloom in the countries that have witnessed the change, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia.

Do you think the current turmoil would give birth to a new Arab world?

I think a new Arab horizon would depend on the broader education scenario in the rest of the Arab world. The region has not changed significantly in terms of governance. The nourishment and cultivation of democratic values will take some time. However, a greater measure of freedom has come about since the two dictators have been removed. However, we are far away from a situation where freedom and education is encouraged. We are distant from achieving democracy and we won’t see cultural advancement and true values of democracy in the region before 2050, at best.

What lessons should countries in the Arab region draw from this revolution?

Drawing lessons and changes will be a very gradual process. If you take Syria and what is going on in that country, there has been absolutely no change in the brutality with which the demonstrators have been treated, and there have been more deaths everyday. Now take the case of Jordan, where there have been some adjustments. When the discontent regarding the regime was expressed, the tribal leaders came together and put forward a scenario of free election saying that the Palestinians would end up ruling the country if free elections were conducted because they are in a majority. The leaders asked Jordanians if this is what they wanted. With this reasoning they were successful in calming the demonstrators.

The one country in the region where the efforts of improvement are badly needed is Saudi Arabia, but the change there has to be by nature and by religion, and it will be very slow. We now know that Saudi women have been admitted to the consultative councils and young men and women are being admitted to high profile universities. There has been some pressure on the king of Saudi Arabia to bring about change but let’s remember that he is very old. We should not forget that the country, which has been very conservative in nature, could only advance very slowly with the right kind of leadership. Now the country where this experiment and liberalization and strengthening of the democratic institutions can be tested is Iraq. It has greater oil wealth than Saudi Arabia, has a high number of educated people and it has suffered years and years of degradation of infrastructure and governing system. This is Iraq’s chance to prove its mettle. In the 1960s, Iraq had the highest number of educated people in the whole Arab world, including Lebanon where they are quite proud about their education levels. Iraq could be the star of the Arab world by
2020 onwards.

How do you view the potential inclusion of Morocco and Jordan into the GCC?

It is actually a counter Arab spring move. But all of this will not materialize. During the Iraq-Kuwait war, Morocco sent soldiers who fought against Iraq.
Although Jordan wanted to participate, it could due to a large number of Palestinians, who live in Jordan and sympathized with Saddam Hussein. Now Jordan and Morocco are considered the countries that would send their soldiers to Arabian Gulf nations, if a need arises. However, I’ll reiterate that this whole idea of inclusion is meaningless. Besides a large distance between Morocco and the Gulf, the countries in North Africa are very different from the oil-rich GCC nations.

The Arab Spring is likely to bring opportunities to this region. What would be the challenges?

On of the obvious risks is the chaos in settling the legal issues. When some ministers are accused of embezzlement and it is not proved in court and as a result they are not put in jail, there would be question marks on the reliability of the new system. When accusations are made against some of the ministers or officials of the former regimes, there is a possibility of those charges being the result of personal grudges. So there might be a corruption in dealing with the corruption of the previous regime. A lot needs to be done to attract tourists to Egypt and Tunisia. The situation in Libya has scared away tourists from visiting resort towns in Egypt.

What would be your suggestion to the new governments to improve economies?

First and foremost they should establish security that includes security of individuals and property, freedom of practicing religion. Once you have achieved stable security, there are several drivers of growth including a huge population, especially in Egypt. The economic fundamentals are strong and investments from abroad are trickling in, but there is a dire need to weed out corruption. I think Arab societies will have to go through another winter to reap the fruits of a real
Arab Spring.

What are your views on promises of aid to countries such as Egypt?

I don’t think they are empty promises, because bodies such as IMF and World Bank are involved and countries such
as Germany and America are taking the lead. But one should keep in mind
that help will not be there tomorrow. In the next few weeks, we will see a cash injection into Egyptian economy, but the rest of the aid will take time to materialize. I think time is needed to put a mechanism in place that will draw
maximum benefit from the aid coming from Europe, America and Gulf
Arab nations.

Do you think this wave of change would sway other nations in this region?

It is very difficult to judge the future by present actions. We have seen calls
for reforms and democracy and those voices are not easy to suffocate.

It is not conceivable that these societies would revert back to their previous practices. However, we will have to wait for a time when governments in this region would work with more openness and transparency.

What are the reasons that led to this revolution throughout the Arab World?

There are proximate causes and underlining causes. The proximate causes are the combination of high food prices, the WikiLeaks cables, the self immolation of the fruit vendor in Tunis, and in different countries trials that were, you know, gaining much public scrutiny
and controversy.

The deeper underlining causes that go back three generations within the Arab World is suffering from what I call post -colonial entropy, there has been a
dissipation and diffusion, fragmentation of the state ever since the first day of independence. So really going back 60 years in the case of many of these countries in the Arab Word. There are many ingredients like over-population, populations of Yemen and Egypt and other countries has tripled or quadrupled in the past half century, low investment in infrastructure and public infrastructure and social services, corruption, and, of course, succession of corrupt regimes during the cold war allied with the US or the Soviet Union, but still are very corrupt and then succession crisis, these are the common factors and the deeper underlying causes

Why did it start in the Arab World?

First there is the pattern in the past few years of more open and transparent information by satellite television and the spread of mobile phones. The second factor is seeing the success of certain Arab areas – the Gulf and the Dubai Effect. This success that did not spread to most of the Arab World is another factor. And third, transparency; the growing popular frustration with corruption and lack of service delivery. The fourth is challenges to public authority because of a succession crisis. Five years ago I wrote the “Sons of the Fathers,” I wrote about King Mohammad the sixth, Saif Gadafi, Gamal Mubarak, Saad Hariri, Basher Al Saad, King Abdullah of Jordan. I said that all of them are in there 30s, all of them have been educated at one western or more than one western institution, have one degree from a western university and speak English or French. We think of them as reformers and I made the argument that none of them will be able to sustainably hold on to power because none is nearly as powerful as their fathers, because in some cases they spend too much time outside of the country; they lack local legitimacy; they have not served in the military in the case of Gamal. I came up with many explanations as to why they will not be as powerful. The fifth and final reason is that when the protestors did go into the streets, you had a situation, certainly not in Libya, not in Yemen, but in other places where the brutality of the crackdown you know in Egypt for example, was not as bad as it could have been, and that reminds us of Ukraine, and Serbia and Georgia because when they had their revolutions five years ago, six years ago, what happened was there was a negotiation over an agreement that the military would not open fire on the public, would not kill, you know, masses of people like Tiananmen Square. And there was lot of lobbing behind the scenes to try to make sure they did not do that. This empowers people, this creates a tipping point.

What is your assessment of Morroco?

I think one has to distinguish across the Arab World between monarchies and non monarchies, and resource-rich verses
resource-poor states, so you have a quadrant right of four part quadrant, resource- rich, resource-poor, monarchy, non monarchy. So Morocco is a resource-poor monarchy and the strategies of resource- poor monarchies are different from the strategies of resource-rich monarchies. In Morocco there has been a lot of tension, there has been very heavy handed movements by the government in recent months and years regarding the media and political oppositions. I thing that we underestimate the extent to which there is still a local legitimacy and support for the regime. So I am not surprised they have lasted a bit longer than people expect.

I think there will be a very strong realization now that there has to be far more public investment and degrees of liberalization, many governments in the region will become more accountable when you see the sacking of a cabinet, the appointment of a new cabinet, a reform of the constitution, the calling of elections, freeing of the media or more independent judiciary. These are seven, eight, nine, 10 different kinds of steps that can be taken to create a more accountable system. These are the steps that are taken to create a more accountable government.

Do you foresee any profound social changes that are going to be emerging out of these revolutions?

The social change began because of the demographic change which long predates the Arab spring. The underlying demographic and social conditions have been there for a few years now because of the youth demographic. We have to go back five to 10 years to understand the social change that is already been in motion.

How will this shape up?

There are two dozen Arab countries and they have different kinds of government and governance and they will continue to be quite different. I don’t think we can hope for any sort of 1989 European-like uniformity which, in a short period of time, large number of countries progressively change their governments entirely to a whole new system and become members of the European Union. I don’t think that’s going to happen in this case. That said, I think there will be a sort of political openness and progress, and a lot of impatience with the governments. This is a very healthy kind of impatience. I do think that they will go in different directions; right now in Libya the civil war is not over and Syria could still collapse further into a civil war. Yemen is most definitely experiencing like a civil war right now, so we are only at the beginning. I would say that if this is a marathon, then we are only entering the second mile.

Tunisia and Egypt are being perceived as potentially at risk on having more radical forces taking power. Some people in the western world fear some people in the Arab World.

I don’t believe so. First of all we have to trust to some extent the democratic forces. If we look at the Algeria model we know the democratic process can go forward and Islamist parties can perform well, but if you cancel that result it can lead to a very, very regrettable period of civil war and violence. Instead, there is the option to give democracy a chance and to allow it to be tried out. The Muslim brotherhood in Egypt is a group with a wide spread social credibility in society, but does not actually have a very strong administrative capacity to govern a state. And so if they do perform well in the parliamentary elections it does not mean they will be immediately able to change policies in a meaningful way. I believe in a concept of the hierarchy of needs of Abraham Maslow, the idea of basic needs must be or fulfilled to satisfy people. And I think that there are certain secular aspects of governance that have to be proven to succeed before people will simply succumb to changes of law in a radical direction. So I don’t really feel that will happen immediately I don’t think it will happen at all, actually.

One of the other byproducts has been the conflict between shias and sunnis, what’s your view on that and what’s your view on what’s next for Iran within this context?

On the one hand I think we overstate the sunni shia rift. There has been certain common conditions of repression that
existed throughout the lower classes of the society irrespective of sect. In Iraq we see there has been a shia sunni civil war, but what emerged is nationalism not necessarily a pure Iranian-backed or Iranian leaning-situation. It’s a mix of things. So I think there is still a strong nationalism. It’s important not to overstate the extent to which Iran is manipulating behind the scenes. People take this a bit too far because Iran is not necessarily a very competent regime by any stretch of the imagination, as we know from its domestic management. Yes they are involved, but they are not the only driver There could be better governance, better management of society through smaller policies domestically and that would actually weaken Iranian influence.

What’s next for Iran? How do you
assess the current situation from here?

In Iran we are always waiting for the revolution that will happen, that will bring down the current regime. That is perhaps a bit too hopeful. Unfortunately the regime has proven to be strong and entrenched, not necessarily resilient but most certainly entrenched. Diplomacy with Iran should continue on all issues rather than being hostage to the nuclear issue. To some extent geography is destiny, Sunni Arab countries must learn to live with Iran. I know there are major efforts under way to contain Iran, which is very difficult to do because it is a state that is very centrally positioned geographically and has a lot of energy resources.

Countries such as Turkey, Russia and China will continue to deal very much with Iran. It’s very hard to isolate it. The Arab countries may attempt this policy of coercion and intimidation, which is perhaps a good partial strategy, but it’s not a good whole strategy.

The whole strategy has to involve more engagement with Iran to attempt to weaken the state and create new centers of power within the country and then may be the next attempt of domestic uprising may be will succeed.