Five and a half years after the invasion of Iraq, the bitter, but undeniable truth for the Saudis is that their closest ally, the United States, has contributed mightily to degrading the kingdom’s position in the Middle East.
The invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq by American forces have shifted the balance of power across the Gulf region. In Riyadh’s case, it has meant watching its perennial rival, Iran, gather strength. The invasion has also inflamed the ancient sectarian rivalry between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims. And on the kingdom’s northern border, the future of an important Arab country remains uncertain. These are huge challenges that Riyadh is pondering, rather than tackling.
In a change from only a year ago, when the media was all about Saudi Arabia’s apparent bid to become the new heavyweight Arab leader, the kingdom now seems to have become more introverted.
There are several reasons for this inactivity. Almost certainly, the kingdom is waiting for a new US administration to settle in and articulate its foreign policy agenda. In addition, an improvement in Iraq’s internal security has taken some urgency off Saudi concerns there.
But some Saudis see the return to a lower foreign-policy profile as a reflection of a problem in the kingdom’s establishment. The Saudis’ biggest foreign policy challenge is “the Saudi challenge,” says Awadh al-Badi, a scholar at the Riyadh-based King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies. “And by that I mean [the need] to develop a certain vision towards the role they want to play in the region.”
The kingdom has a lot of moral and economic clout that would allow it to easily fill the current leadership vacuum in the Arab world, al-Badi adds. But Riyadh appears reluctant to take on that responsibility, he says, and instead “what we see is … a status quo country trying to manage things as they come.”
The last turn. After the ascension of King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz in 2005, the kingdom adopted a more activist foreign policy, even demonstrating at times a willingness to oppose Washington. In 2007, for example, it brokered the Mecca Agreement between the Palestinian parties of Fatah and Hamas over US objections. The deal fell apart, but Saudi Arabia showed it could do it on its own.
Riyadh also vigorously promoted an Arab peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even going so far as using uncharacteristically blunt language to criticize Hezbollah for provoking the 2006 Israeli invasion of its northern neighbor.
Observers have speculated that Saudi Arabia might replace traditional leaders among Arab nations, who have now been sidelined: Egypt by internal economic and political problems, Syria by allying with Iran, and Iraq by the US occupation.
This change would have been significant. The traditional culture of Saudi Arabia has an inherent streak of politeness combined with a strong aversion to criticize.
The kingdom’s efforts to transcend this ideology are greater than people realize, notes Hadi Amr, executive director of the Brookings Institute think tank. “Traditionally, in this part of the world, you discuss your problems privately and not through the media. And so that’s how things have been done,” he adds.

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