This is what happened back in 1999 when Madeleine Albright made unprecedented overtures to Iran. Jammed in its own institutional convulsions, Tehran hardly reacted to them (this was echoed by the Bush administration’s own refusal to respond to Iran’s “comprehensive deal” in 2003).
The same chaotic pattern is evident in Iran’s contradicting opinions of the recent package of incentives. Iranian dignitaries have been unrestrained in expressing their views in favor or against the package, but a consistent answer has failed to materialize. This vindicates Iran’s claim that its political system is pluralist. However, what is the use of pluralism if it produces chaotic diplomacy?
The second implication is that the Supreme Leader is the only foreign-policy actor whose decisions cannot be contested by either the Majlis or the president. Not even the Council of Guardians can hold sway. He holds significant executive power and his opinions are never bypassed. The key to the dilemma lies with him. An engagement plan with any chance of succeeding must target him alone. As the guardian of the regime, he is the one who needs to be reassured about what the West’s intentions are. If the main foreign powers manage to meaningfully engage him then nobody will be able to challenge his decision to bargain. But it’s no small task, as his mistrust of Washington is entrenched.
It will be interesting to see if this is a tack the 44th US president will take. During the first 2008 presidential debate, John McCain attempted to corner Barack Obama by claiming that he intended to legitimize Ahmadinejad (and his anti-Israeli diatribes) by sitting with him, without preconditions.
President-elect Obama retorted “Ahmadinejad is not the most powerful person in Iran. So he may not be the right person to talk to.” This exchange says a lot about what Washington’s policy towards Iran will be a few months from now.
Indeed, the new president, when he takes power in January, is considering engaging Iran without preconditions. He also seems to understand that the Supreme Leader may be a better interlocutor. It’s the first time a Western leader has made this point.
It is startling that the West has always shunned talking to the Supreme Leader directly. This tendency has only deepened mutual mistrust. The Supreme Leader perceives himself to be sidelined while the West grows frustrated from dealing with government officials whose decisions can be reversed. The West’s habit of dealing only with the president and the foreign minister, whose hands are tied by so many different factors, stands no chance of delivering a cohesive answer on a potential “grand bargain.” In Iran, like anywhere else, one has to talk to the boss.

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