The Majlis (parliament) can also interfere with the government’s policy, in three different ways: it can set up its own committees on matters of foreign relation, it can seek clarification from cabinet ministers and it can withhold approval for international treaties, preventing them from coming into force. The Majlis has used these prerogatives in the past to influence foreign policy, usually for the worse. The Council of Guardians, the equivalent of a constitutional oversight committee, can also disrupt foreign policy if it considers it unconstitutional.
When there’s animosity between the president and the Majlis, which has been the case consistently since Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, the Majlis be-comes more assertive in foreign policy. Its sessions become the stage of heated foreign-policy debates. Parliamentary discussion of foreign policy in turn in-fluences public opinion, which is much more important in Iran than tends to be acknowledged. Although the government can push through an unpopular policy, obtaining public approval will give a policy a lot more force.
It gets even more confusing. The Supreme Leader is not simply the foremost authority in defense and security. He is also the ultimate power broker. His support of a given foreign policy measure usually suppresses resistance in the system and eases implementation. He can make or break a foreign policy move. Although he usually confines himself to the role of an arbiter and intervenes in rare situations where consensus is elusive, no policy of importance can bypass him.
The lessons. It’s a convoluted system. One implication, when it comes to engaging Iran in a “grand bargain,” is that there are polarized views on how to relate to the West, and the US in particular. There is a likely chance that the foreign-policy apparatus, which seems engaged in endless factionalist arguments, won’t even manage to give a clear answer to the West’s engagement proposal.

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