Harassment and discrimination exist, of course. Especially in the country’s educational system, which requires schools to be open on Saturdays in violation of Jewish law. But it’s inaccurate to say Iranian Jews live in fear or that the country is anti-Semitic. Iran does have a history of anti-Semitism, like many other countries. But there is no history of pogroms or organized violence against Jews. Many left Iran after the Revolution but so did Iranians of all confessions and backgrounds. Seeking refuge abroad is far from being a Jewish chasse grade.
During WWII, the Iranian government successfully convinced Nazi dignitaries that Iranian Jews had fully integrated into the “Iranian Aryan race,” thus saving the lives of Iranian Jews living in territories under German rule. Iranian diplomats in various European postings, including Amir Abbas Hodeida, the Shah’s longest serving Prime Minister, saved thousands of Jews from the camps by delivering Iranian passports to them and smuggling them out of Nazi-occupied territories.
Equating Iran with Nazi Germany (like former CIA head James Woolsey did on several occasions) is inaccurate and unfair.
‘There is no need to fully engage Iran. Partial engagement may suffice.’ Self-defeating. It is ineffective to engage Iran only on the Iraqi and nuclear dossiers while all of Iran’s demands are pushed aside and its concerns ignored. Engage-ment is a two-way street. Therefore in order to entice Iran to cooperate, engagement must be total and encompass all the issues at stake. Beyond Iraq, nukes and proxies, that includes Iran’s legitimate security concerns, an end to the embargo regimes imposed on it, a recognition of its role in the region by consulting and engaging it on all regional dossiers including Israel-Palestine and an acknowledgement of its energy needs. Only a “grand bargain” can yield tangible results. Historical precedents show engagement is a successful tool.
Some commentators and policymakers also claim that engaging Iran has been tried in the past and yielded no result. This is false, too. Reformist President Mohammad Khatami was willing to reach a grand bargain. Khatami’s Iran was actually instrumental in providing Washington with intelligence on the Taliban ahead of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. So there was some meat in Khatami’s overture. A positive US res-ponse would certainly have strengthened his hand domestically and would have been a sign of support for a reformist under serious pressure from hardliners. Unfortunately, in the wake of Iran’s help in Afghanistan, the US administration decided to include Iran in the so-called “Axis of Evil,” ruining Khatami’s credibility at home and paving the way for the hard-liners’ return to power.
A shortsighted and ideologically driven US policy demonstrated to Iran’s hardliners and to many disillusioned reformists that the US cannot be en-gaged, and that Washington only understands the language of confrontation and force. Continued international pressure will only legitimize Ahmadinejad’s stance and help increase his chances of being re-elected.

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